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Abstract
We present a theory of the relation between health and retirement that generates
testable predictions regarding the interaction of health, wealth and financial
incentives in retirement decisions. The theory predicts (i) that wealthier individuals
(compared to poorer individuals) are more likely to retire for health reasons
(affordability proposition), and (ii) that health problems make older workers
more responsive to financial incentives encouraging retirement (reinforcement
proposition). We test these predictions using administrative data on older employees
in the Dutch healthcare sector for whom we link adverse health events, proxied by
unanticipated hospitalizations, to information on retirement decisions and actual
incentives from administrative records of the pension funds. Exploiting unexpected
health shocks and quasi-exogenous variation in financial incentives for retirement
due to reforms, we account for the endogeneity of health and financial incentives.
Making use of the actual individual pension rights diminishes downward bias in
estimates of the effect of pension incentives. We find support for our affordability
and reinforcement propositions. Both propositions require the benefits function to be
convex, as in our data. Our theory and empirical findings highlight the importance
of assessing financial incentives for their potential reinforcement of health shocks
and point to the possibility that differences in responses to financial incentives and
health shocks across countries may relate to whether the benefit function is concave
or convex.
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health capital; optimal control
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1 Introduction
There is a high degree of consensus that financial incentives deriving from social security
and pension plans are important determinants of the retirement decision and that they
have contributed to the general decrease in labour-force participation of older workers
(Lumsdaine and Mitchell 1999; Gruber and Wise 2004). The generous early-retirement
(ER) and disability-insurance (DI) arrangements prevailing in the 80s and 90s in the
Netherlands have contributed substantially to the fall in labour-force participation of older
workers (Lindeboom, 2012). As these arrangements were no longer deemed sustainable
in the face of a rapidly aging population, and to ease the financial burden imposed on
the social security system, several reforms were introduced, including the abolishment of
ER schemes and a raise of the statutory retirement age (Euwals et al., 2010a). It is clear
that the effectiveness of such policies depends on whether and how workers can respond
to financial incentives such as pension wealth in the presence of health problems (Gruber
and Wise 2004). Many studies find ill health to increase the likelihood of ER at older ages
(Currie and Madrian 1999; Kerkhofs et al. 1999; Disney et al. 2006; Lindeboom 2012;
Lindeboom and Kerkhofs 2009).
We contribute to both the theoretical and empirical literature in this area. So far, the
theory that has most frequently sustained this literature is the Option Value retirement
model proposed by Stock and Wise (1990). This model assumes that individuals compare
in each period the expected net present value of retiring now with that of continuing
to work and retiring at the optimal age in the future. The Option Value model does
not consider health explicitly. In this paper we therefore develop a stylized model to
integrate health into a model of retirement behavior and financial incentives. It is based on
health-capital theory, the foundations of which were laid by the seminal work of Grossman
(1972a,b). In our extension of the model, (1) we assume diminishing returns to health
investment, which addresses problems with commonly employed linear investment models
(see Galama, 2015), and (2) we model longevity as a distinct choice variable (Ehrlich and
Chuma 1990). We also introduce leisure time, retirement benefits and the choice of the
optimal retirement age. In contrast to the extant literature (e.g., Stock and Wise, 1990),
the resulting theory models the effect of financial incentives, health, wealth, and longevity
on the optimal age of retirement explicitly.
The model not only generates the standard predictions, i.e. that the probability
of retirement increases with wealth, with ill health and with more generous financial
incentives for retirement, but also makes possible predictions about the interaction
between health and financial incentives in retirement decisions. The theory predicts
(i) that wealthier individuals (compared to poorer) are more likely to retire for health
reasons (affordability proposition), and (ii) that health problems make older workers
more responsive to financial incentives encouraging retirement (reinforcement proposition).
Both propositions require the benefits function to be convex, as in our data.
We test these predictions on actual early-retirement decisions of workers in the Dutch
health care sector in the presence of unanticipated health shocks, exploiting information
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on their pension wealth and financial incentives. We do this by linking accurate individual
pension benefit information from the second largest pension fund in the Netherlands
(Pensioenfonds Zorg en Welzijn, PFZW), to hospital admission diagnoses from hospital
records and socio-demographic information from municipality registers. Rather than
having to rely on estimates, we are able to use the actual pension wealth and financial
incentives that are provided annually to the employees. This avoids downward biased
estimation of the effects of financial incentives due to measurement error when variables
are not directly observed and need to be proxied (Belloni and Alessie, 2009). We use
unanticipated hospitalizations as quasi-exogenous adverse health events, and link these to
subsequent early-retirement decisions.
For a five-year period (1999 to 2003) we exploit three sources of variation to
identify the effects of financial incentives on retirement: (i) variation in early retirement
replacement rates over successive birth cohorts due to the gradual transition from a
previous actuarially unfair early-retirement scheme to an actuarially fair early-retirement
scheme (Flexpensioen, FLEX; from January 1, 1999, replacement rates decreased by one
percentage point per year of birth), (ii) variation in eligibility conditions depending on
the year of birth and tenure (e.g., individuals born after 1948 are not eligible for the most
generous scheme, and (iii) conditional on the year of birth, the individual variation in the
duration and size of contributions to the scheme, resulting from differences in tenure and
in the full/part-time employment history of individuals. By exploiting health variation
that is arguably exogenous to labour-market outcomes by virtue of it being unexpected,
we avoid the well-known problem of endogeneity of self-reported health variables (cf. e.g.,
Bound 1991). To this end, we selected a subset of hospital admissions for diagnoses that
are likely to correspond to a new and unexpected health problem (conditional on the
individual not having been hospitalized in the previous year).
The effects of financial incentives on (early) retirement have been widely documented
(for a review, see, e.g., Lindeboom, 2012) and many studies have also found health (shocks)
to have an impact on retirement (e.g., Currie and Madrian 1999; Kerkhofs et al. 1999;
Disney et al. 2006; Lindeboom and Kerkhofs 2009; Garc´ıa-Go´mez et al. 2013). Far fewer
studies have looked at the interaction between financial incentives and health, because
typically most surveys do not collect detailed information on both. Wise (2016) explores
the relationship between the option value and retirement across health quintiles in twelve
countries, and finds that the relationship between financial incentives and health differs
across countries in both sign and significance. However, the lack of a comprehensive
theory that models (early-)retirement decisions as a function of both health and financial
incentives prevents the authors of the study to rationalize these cross-country differences.
Of course, ER financial incentives may have an effect not only on the probability that an
older worker transits into early retirement, but also on other exit routes. In our analysis we
focus on the effect of ER incentives on transitions into ER. It seems reasonable to abstract
from DI claiming behavior in our model since recent Dutch reforms have closed-off the
substitute pathway of disability insurance as an exit route into early retirement (Euwals
et al. 2012).
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Studies that focus on the effects of health on labour supply have mostly used
self-reported health measures, which will lead to an overestimation of the impact of poor
health on employment if health problems are over reported as a justification for inactivity.
The use of self-reported health indicators to instrument for reported work incapacity may
similarly cause bias in the same direction (Bound, 1991). Many of the previous studies had
to rely on crude health controls, such as changes in self-reported health status, or other
subjective health measures, rather than on data of actual medical events, since these were
not available in socioeconomic surveys (Bound et al. 1999; Disney et al. 2006; Banks
et al. 2007; Hagan et al. 2008; Roberts et al. 2010). In these studies, it was therefore
not possible to assess whether ill health causes retirement due to reverse causality (work
affects health) and due to unobservables that influence both health and work.
Adverse health shocks gathered from hospitalization data provide a source of
unanticipated variation in health status, which can be used to identify the causal effect
of health on work status (Lindeboom 2012, Lindeboom et al. 2016). Only a few studies
have employed unanticipated health shocks to this end. Møller Dano (2005) uses road
accidents recorded for a 10% sample of the Danish population and finds a significant effect
on employment only for males, for whom the employment rate decreases by around 10%
after an accident and does not recover in the subsequent six years. Halla and Zweimu¨ller
(2013) study accidents experienced on the way to and from work, which they argue are
less likely to induce selection problems. They find negative effects on employment (4
percentage points on average) and on earnings, conditional on remaining employed. The
effects are larger for individuals that are less attached to the labour market, such as females
and blue-collar workers. Garc´ıa-Go´mez et al. (2013) use acute hospitalizations for Dutch
workers to identify the causal effects of health shocks on employment and on income. They
show that, on average, an acute hospital admission lowers the employment probability by
seven percentage points and results in a 30% loss of personal income for those entering
DI two years after the shock. They also find that a health shock is both more likely to
occur and to have a larger relative impact on employment and on income at the bottom
of the income distribution. More recently, Dobkin et al. (2016) used U.S. non-pregnancy
related hospital admissions – for individuals who were not recently hospitalized to study
the impact of admissions on a wide range of economic consequences, including out-of
pocket medical spending, unpaid medical bills, bankruptcy, earnings, income, access to
credit, and consumer borrowing. They find that the elderly - who have health insurance
coverage through Medicare and relatively little labour-market earnings - appear to suffer
little or no economic consequences from hospital admissions. In our empirical analysis,
we will also use data on hospitalizations and diagnoses to construct a measure of new and
unanticipated health events and to investigate their effect on retirement.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss ER schemes in the
Netherlands in general and in the health care sector in particular. Section 3 presents
our theory of health, retirement and pension incentives and makes predictions. Section 4
presents our empirical strategy to evaluate the effects of financial incentives, health shocks,
and their interaction, for ER transitions. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents
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the results and section 7 summarizes and concludes.
2 Early retirement (ER) in the Netherlands in 1999-2003
In the period under consideration, retirees in the Netherlands received a flat-rate
pay-as-you-go state pension, starting at age 65. The state pension was usually
supplemented by a mandatory occupational pension that is capital funded and mostly
defined benefit. Many sectors had early retirement schemes, independent of the
capital-funded occupational pension until the late 90s. These were on a pay-as-you-go basis
and were highly actuarially unfair: the implicit tax on continuing to work for one more
year was about 100% (Kapteyn and de Vos, 1999). Unions and employers organizations
agreed to gradually switch to an actuarially fair early-retirement scheme (FLEX) from
January 1, 1999, in the health care sector. Individuals claiming FLEX benefits at age 60
are entitled to 1.75% of their base salary for each year of participation. Individuals can
claim early-retirement benefits through the FLEX scheme as soon as they become 55 or
postpone until 65 with actuarially fair adjustments (Euwals et al, 2010b).
A transitional early-retirement scheme (OBU; Overbruggingsregeling Uitkeringen) was
introduced for workers close to age sixty. In particular, workers born before 1949, who
are currently not receiving a disability benefit and who have worked in the sector for at
least ten years, became eligible for OBU benefits. The replacement rate is reduced by one
percentage point for every next cohort entitled to OBU, i.e., workers born before 1939 get
a replacement rate of 80% of their gross last salary, workers born in 1940 get 79%, ..., and
workers born in 1948 get 71% of their gross last salary. No adjustments were made for
later retirement, thus postponement of benefits implied losing them.
Figure 1 shows the expected median pension benefit for a 55 year-old PFZW worker,
for both the FLEX and OBU schemes. Note that financially the most attractive scheme
up to retirement age 60 is FLEX and that the FLEX benefits function is convex with age.
Between retirement ages 60 and 62, the median individual would be better off choosing
to retire under OBU, while after retirement age 62 the median individual would prefer
FLEX again. The combination of FLEX and OBU creates a convex curve due to FLEX
with a bump at age 60 (and a smaller bump at age 61) due to OBU.
Thus, the existence of the two retirement options generates a convex curve due to
FLEX with a marked increase in the benefits function at retirement age 60 due to OBU,
which is visualized in Figure 2, where we plot several centiles of the distribution of benefits,
assuming that these 55 year-old individuals opt for the most beneficial scheme. The 50th
centile graph (triangles) corresponds to the pattern in Figure 1. Note that the 5th, 25th
and 75th centile curves are also convex with a bump at age 60.1
Not surprisingly, the actual, empirical hazard of retirement (Figure 3) shows a marked
peak at retirement age 60, from about 5% at retirement age 59 to slightly less than 50%.
The hazard is close to 40% at retirement age 61 and then stabilizes at about 10% thereafter.
1Only for the 75th centile the curve turns concave after age 63.
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Figure 1: Expected median benefits of retiring at different ages, by early-retirement scheme. The
figure shows the expected benefits at age 55 of the sample of individuals working at age 55, regardless
of their later decisions. Authors’ calculations based on the sample of workers aged 55 in PFZW
during the period 1999-2002.
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Figure 2: Distribution of expected benefits of retiring a different ages. The figure shows the
expected benefits at age 55 of the sample of individuals working at age 55, regardless of their later
decisions. For each individual, the incentives used are those from the program (FLEX or OBU)
that is most beneficial. Authors’ calculations based on the sample of workers aged 55 in PFZW
during the period 1999-2002.
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Figure 3: Empirical retirement hazard function. Authors’ calculations based on the sample of
individuals in PFZW during the period 1999-2002.
3 A theory of health, retirement and longevity
To inform our empirical analysis of the relation between health, financial incentives,
and retirement we develop a theory of the role of financial incentives, health, wealth,
and longevity. The foundation of the model is provided by the canonical theory of the
demand for health, due to Grossman (1972a,b) (see also Galama 2015). In contrast to
Grossman (1972a,b) we employ diminishing returns to health investment, which addresses
the degeneracy of commonly employed linear investment models (Galama, 2015). We also
model longevity as a choice variable (Ehrlich and Chuma 1990). We then introduce leisure
time, retirement benefits, and the choice of the optimal retirement age, to arrive at a theory
of health, wealth, financial incentives, retirement, and longevity. In contrast to the extant
literature, the resulting theory models incentives, health, wealth, and longevity explicitly
(as opposed to, e.g., the canonical model of retirement due to Stock and Wise, 1990 which
compares value functions for different ages).2 Since our theory analyses optimal decisions,
optimality conditions compare marginal benefits with marginal costs. Our theoretical
model thus provides an alternative framework for analyzing retirement decisions with
the advantage of making explicit the relations of interest (e.g., health, wealth, financial
incentives, longevity and retirement in our case).
In the next sections we formulate the model (section 3.1), present the first-order
2These value functions, i.e. sums of future utility streams, are constructed using information about
financial incentives, wealth and survival probabilities. The subtle difference is that these are “embedded”
in these functions whereas our approach models them explicitly.
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conditions (section 3.2), analyze the optimality condition for the optimal age of retirement,
and make predictions (section 3.3).
3.1 Formulation
Individuals maximize the life-time utility function∫ R
0
U(t)e−βtdt+
∫ T
R
U(t)e−βtdt, (1)
where R is the age of retirement (endogenous), T denotes total lifetime (endogenous),
β is a subjective discount factor and individuals derive utility U [C(t), L(t), H(t)] from
consumption C(t), leisure time L(t) and health H(t). The utility function is increasing in
each of its arguments and strictly concave.
The objective function (1) is maximized subject to the following dynamic constraints:
∂H(t)
∂t
= µI(t)I(t)
α − d(t)H(t), (2)
∂A(t)
∂t
= δA(t) + Y [H(t)]− pC(t)C(t)− pI(t)I(t), (3)
the total time budget Ω
Ω = τw(t) + L(t) + s[H(t)], (4)
and initial and end conditions: H(0), H(T ), A(0) and A(T ) are given. An individual
dies at age T when health reaches a minimum health level (H(T ) ≡ Hmin) (Grossman
1972a,b).
Health capital H(t) (equation 2) can be improved through investments in health I(t)
(remedial and preventive care, exercise) and deteriorates at the biological deterioration
rate d(t). The production process for health fH(t) = µI(t)I(t)
α is assumed to obey the
law of diminishing returns (0 < α < 1) on investment I(t) and has an efficiency µI(t).
Assets A(t) (equation 3) provide a return δ (return on capital), increase with income
Y [H(t)] ≡ w(t) {Ω− L(t)− s[H(t)]} , 0 ≤ t < R (5)
Y [H(t)] ≡ b(R), R ≤ t < T (6)
and decrease with expenditures on consumption C(t) and investment I(t) goods and
services, purchased in the market at prices pC(t) and pI(t), respectively.
Ω, the total time available in any period (equation 4), is the sum of all possible uses
τw(t) (work), L(t) (leisure), and s[H(t)] (sick time; a decreasing function of health).
Earnings during working life equal the wage rate w(t) times the time spend working
τw(t) (see equation 5). During retirement individuals do not work, i.e.
τw(t) = 0, (7)
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and receive a state pension annuity b(R), assumed to be a function of retirement age R.
Thus, we have the following optimal control problem: the objective function (1) is
maximized with respect to the controls C(t), L(t), I(t), the parameters R and T , and
subject to the constraints (2) to (7). The Lagrangian (see, e.g., Seierstad and Sydsaeter
1987, Caputo 2005) of this problem is:
= = U [C(t), L(t), H(t)]e−βt + qH(t)∂H(t)
∂t
+ qA(t)
∂A(t)
∂t
+ λτw(t)τw(t), (8)
where qH(t) is the marginal value of health (associated with the differential equation (2)
for health H(t)), qA(t) is the marginal value of wealth (associated with the differential
equation (3) for assets A(t)), and λτw(t) is the multiplier associated with condition (7)
(λτw(t) = 0 if τw(t) > 0 and λτw(t) > 0 if τw(t) = 0). The conditions for optimal retirement
R and optimal longevity T follow from the dynamic envelope theorem (e.g., Caputo 2005,
p. 293):
∂
∂R
∫ T
0
=(t)dt = =(R−)−=(R+) +
∫ T
0
∂=(t)
∂R
dt = 0, (9)
∂
∂T
∫ T
0
=(t)dt = =(T ) = 0, (10)
where R− indicates the limit in which R is approached from below and R+ the limit in
which R is approached from above.3 Further, the co-state variables qA(t) and qH(t) are
continuous in R.
3.2 First-order conditions
The first-order conditions for consumption, leisure and health investment follow from
setting the derivative of the Lagrangian (8) w.r.t. each control function to zero:
∂U
∂C
= qA(t)pC(t)e
βt 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (11)
∂U
∂L
= qA(t)w(t)e
βt 0 ≤ t < R,
= λτw(t)e
βt R ≤ t ≤ T, (12)
piI(t) =
qH(t)
qA(t)
0 ≤ t ≤ T, (13)
where the marginal cost of health investment is defined as
piI(t) ≡ pI(t)I(t)
1−α
αµI(t)
. (14)
3To the best of our knowledge, Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) were the first to explicitly model endogenous
longevity in the health-capital literature using condition (10) and Kuhn et al. (2015) were the first to
model endogenous retirement using condition (9). However, Kuhn et al. (2015) model health and longevity
through a survival function. As a result there is no clear distinction between health and longevity.
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The dynamic equations for the marginal value of health qH(t) and the marginal value of
wealth qA(t) follow from the conditions −∂qH(t)/∂t = ∂=(t)/∂H(t) and −∂qA(t)/∂t =
∂=(t)/∂A(t). We have
∂qA(t)
∂t
= −qA(t)δ 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (15)
∂qH(t)
∂t
= qH(t)d(t)− ∂U
∂H
e−βt + qA(t)w(t)
∂s
∂H
0 ≤ t < R,
= qH(t)d(t)− ∂U
∂H
e−βt + λτw(t)
∂s
∂H
R ≤ t ≤ T. (16)
The three first-order conditions (11), (12), and (13) determine the optimal solutions of
the controls consumption C(t), leisure time L(t), and health investment I(t), respectively.
The two dynamic equations (2) and (3) determine the state functions health capital H(t)
and wealth (assets) A(t), and the two co-state equations (15) and (16) determine the
marginal value of wealth qA(t) and of health qH(t). The optimal retirement age R and
optimal length of life T are determined by the conditions (9) and (10). The initial and
end conditions H(0) and H(T ) = Hmin determine qH(0), the initial and end conditions
A(0) and A(T ) determine qA(0), and λτw(t) is determined by condition (7)
τw(t) = Ω− L(t)− s[H(t)] = 0. (17)
3.3 Retirement
Our interest lies primarily in understanding the relation between health, financial
incentives, wealth and retirement. The condition (9) for optimal retirement R requires
us to consider the difference in the Lagrangian right before and right after retirement,
=(R−)−=(R+). Since health investment I(t) is determined by the ratio of the marginal
value of health qH(t) to the marginal value of wealth qA(t) (see 13), both of which are
continuous in R, health investment is also continuous in R, i.e. I(R−) = I(R+). This is
not true, by construction, for leisure time L(t) as individuals work right before retirement,
but don’t work right after retirement.4 Thus leisure time exhibits a discrete jump upward
at retirement, L(R+) > L(R−). The model predicts that consumption also jumps at
retirement as the jump in leisure time may change the marginal utility of consumption (see
equation 11). This is consistent with the findings that U.S. and British households reduce
consumption near retirement (Banks, Blundell and Tanner, 1998; Bernheim, Skinner and
Weinberg, 2001), which would suggest that on average ∂2U/∂C∂L > 0.5
4I.e. τw(R−) > 0 ⇒ L(R−) < Ω− s[H(R)] = L(R+) (note that sick time is continuous in R as health
H(R) is continuous in R).
5Because the mechanisms underlying this observed drop in consumption at retirement are not well
understood, and might be inconsistent with the life-cycle model, this drop in consumption at retirement has
been referred to as the retirement-consumption puzzle. In a series of papers Hurd and Rohwedder (2003,
2006, 2013), using panel data, have explored several possible mechanisms explaining the consumption
decline. They find that prior to retirement workers anticipated on average a decline of 13.3% in
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With the above and noting that state and co-state functions are continuous in R, and
λτw(R)τw(R) = 0, the condition (9) reduces to
Y [H(R−)] = b(R)− ∂b(R)
∂R
1
δ
[
1− e−δ(T−R)
]
+
1
qA(R)
[U(R+)− U(R−)] e−βR
+ pC(R) [C(R−)− C(R+)] , (18)
where Y [H(R−)] = w(R)τw(R−) = w(R){Ω − L(R−) − s[H(R)]}, and we have replaced
the limits R− and R+ with R for functions that are continuous in R. Briefly, the
optimal age of retirement R requires the benefits of working, consisting of labour income
Y [H(R−)] = w(R)τw(R−), to equal the benefits of retirement, consisting of the pension
benefit (first term on the RHS), the cost of delayed retirement (second term on the RHS),
utility from increased leisure time (third term on the RHS), and savings from reduced
consumption (fourth term on the RHS). Individuals remain in retirement if benefits from
retirement exceed benefits from work and will re-enter the labour force if this condition
no longer holds. We explain the optimality condition (18) for the age of retirement R in
more detail below.
Consider first the case where utility U(t) is continuous in R6 and the state pension
annuity b(R) = b is independent of the age of retirement. The decision to retire is then
simply determined by the age R at which earnings from retirement b exceed, for the first
time, earnings from work Y [H(t)] = w(t)τw(t) (labour income Y [H(t)] declines due to
worsening health with age). Generous retirement (e.g., social security) benefits b and low
labour income Y [H(t)] encourage early retirement.
If the pension benefit b(R) is a function of the age of retirement R, it may be
attractive for individuals to delay retirement in order to receive higher benefits b(R)
per period. However, this comes at the cost of a shortened horizon T − R over which
these benefits are received, as reflected in the term (∂b(R)/∂R)1δ
[
1− e−δ(T−R)]. Steeply
declining pension benefits (−∂b(R)/∂R large) induce retirement by raising the benefit
b(R) − (∂b(R)/∂R)1δ
[
1− e−δ(T−R)] of retirement. Indeed, Lazear (1986) finds that
pensions are typically actuarially unfair, and that sharp decreases in the actuarial value
of retirement with continued work, are used as a device by employers to induce earlier
retirement of workers.
spending and after retirement they recollected a decline of 12.9%: thus widespread surprise (inconsistent
with the assumption of rational behavior underlying life-cycle models) is not the explanation for the
retirement-consumption puzzle. Workers with substantial wealth both anticipated and recollected a
decline. In the low-wealth population where spending did decline at higher rates, the main explanation
for the decline appears to be a high rate of early retirement due to poor health (poor health is found to
be associated with above-average declines). Hurd and Rohwedder conclude that conventional models of
economic behavior can account for the observed changes in consumption near retirement, with primary
mechanisms being the cessation of work-related expenses, unexpected retirement due to a health shock or
the substitution of time for spending.
6Hence there are no jumps in leisure time L(t) or in consumption C(t) at R. This is for example the
case for a utility function that is additively separable in its arguments.
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Further, leisure time jumps at retirement providing additional utility in retirement.
If ∂2U/∂C∂L ∼ 0 (consumption and leisure are neither complements nor substitutes
in utility), the monetary equivalent of this additional utility from leisure consist of the
discounted difference in utility divided by the marginal value of wealth at the age of
retirement 1qA(R) [U(R−)− U(R+)] e−βR. Because individuals value leisure in retirement
they do not need to be compensated dollar for dollar in income, and retirement occurs
while pension benefits are less than labour income.
In addition, the marginal utility of consumption might change as a result of the
jump in leisure. As discussed earlier, plausibly consumption and leisure are complements
in utility ∂2U/∂C∂L > 0, so that greater leisure time L(R+) > L(R−) reduces the
demand for consumption C(R+) < C(R−). This reduces the gain in utility from
leisure U(R+) − U(R−), but has the advantage of reducing the cost of consumption
pC(R)[C(R−)− C(R+)].7
Mechanisms The condition (18) for the age of retirement highlights several
mechanisms. Existing theories of retirement (e.g., Stock and Wise, 1990) model
the retirement decision as the trade-off between retirement wealth (e.g., the net present
value [NPV] of the pension annuity, first and second terms on the RHS), foregone labour
earnings (term on the left-hand side [LHS]), and utility from additional leisure time
(third term on the RHS). Such models are useful for understanding the role of financial
incentives as mechanisms to dis- or encourage postponing retirement. In our theory
financial incentives are modeled through the functional dependence (or structure) of the
pension annuity b(R) on the retirement age R. The functional form is obtained from
pension plan rules such as the earnings replacement rate at each age and the early and
normal (or full) statutory retirement ages. Typically, before the age of early retirement
pensions cannot be claimed and retirement is unattractive. Between the early and normal
(or full) retirement ages the replacement rate increases with delayed retirement, which
induces some individuals to delay retirement till the normal retirement age. Spikes in the
retirement hazard are often observed at the early and normal statutory retirement ages
(see Figure 3 for our setting).
The novel aspect of our theory is that we not only model financial incentives through
b(R), but also explicitly model the role of health H(t), health investment I(t) (e.g., medical
care), wealth A(t) (other than pension wealth
∫ T
R b(R)e
−δtdt), and longevity T . It is the
inclusion of these additional determinants of retirement, as well as their interaction with
financial incentives, that allows for the modeling of several mechanisms into retirement
that have largely remained unexplored. Our theory also highlights an additional benefit of
retirement, consisting of potential reductions in consumption (fourth term on the RHS).
7The change in utility arguably remains positive (higher utility immediately following retirement;
U(R+) − U(R−) > 0) as the effect of a change in consumption on utility is a second-order effect (and
thus relatively small), operating through the effect that a change in leisure time has on the marginal
utility of consumption and thereby on the level of consumption and on utility, while the effect of a jump
in leisure has a first-order (direct) effect on utility (and is thus plausibly larger).
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We explain all of this in more detail in the next section.
Stylized representation Figure 4 provides a stylized representation of the optimality
condition for retirement (18). The optimal age of retirement R∗ is the age at which the
marginal benefits of work, consisting of earnings Y [HH(R)] (horizontal dotted line and
first term on the LHS of 18), where HH(R) indicates the health of a healthy individual (we
will make comparisons later with an unhealthy individual), equal the marginal benefits
of retirement. The latter consist of the pension benefit (solid line labeled b(R) and first
term on the RHS of 18) minus the cost of delaying retirement (second term on the RHS),
utility from additional leisure (third term on the RHS), and potential cost reductions due
to reduced consumption (fourth term on the RHS). These additional marginal benefits of
retirement (second, third and fourth terms on the RHS of 18) are labeled “Rest” in Figure
4. For simplicity both the marginal benefit of work Y [HH(R)] and the remaining marginal
benefits of retirement (labeled “Rest”) are shown as being constant with retirement age.
Typically, before the age of early retirement, pensions cannot be claimed and b(R)
is small (shown for simplicity as b(R) being zero), benefits b(R) then rise between the
early and normal (or full) retirement ages, after which they typically modestly increase
or modestly decline (represented by the horizontal dependence for large R). We show a
convex relationship, consistent with the early retirement scheme (see Figures 1 and 2).	
Rearly 
 
Y[HH (R)]
− Rest
	
R* 
R 
Rest	
b(R)	
 Y[HH (R)] 	
Y[H®]	
Rnormal 
Figure 4: Stylized representation of the optimality condition for retirement (18).
When an individual is working, the marginal benefits of work exceed those of
retirement. In Figure 4 this represents values of R to the left of R∗ for which b(R) is
smaller than Y [HH(R)] − Rest (the lower horizontal dotted line). The optimal age of
retirement R∗ is the age at which the b(R) curve crosses Y [HH(R)]−Rest.
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For a healthy individual, and a typical replacement rate of 72 percent b(R) =
0.72Y [H(R−)],8 the remaining terms (second to fourth on the RHS, i.e. what we term
“Rest”) combine to about 28 percent of the level of earnings just before retirement
Y [H(R−)]. Thus typically the pension benefit b(R) is the dominant benefit of retirement
(RHS of 18) and retirement occurs as a result of financial incentives, i.e. the optimal age
of retirement is most sensitive to the pension structure (or functional dependence of b(R)
on R).
Wealth Figure 5 provides a stylized representation of the effect of wealth on the optimal
age of retirement (18), conditional on health status HH(R) for a healthy individual. The
comparison here is between two identical individuals (importantly, with identical health)
who differ in their private and/or pension wealth. Wealth decreases the marginal value
of wealth qA(R),
9 thereby increasing the utility from additional leisure (third term on the
RHS of 18) and shifting the horizontal line Y [HH(R)] down. Wealthy individuals retire
earlier as they value leisure relatively more: all else equal, they can be expected to retire
earlier: wealth has a positive effect on the retirement probability.10
Health Figure 6 shows a stylized representation of the effect of health. Consider two
individuals: healthy HH(R) and unhealthy HU (R). Reduced health HU (R) (i.e. after a
health shock) reduces earnings Y [HU (R)] thereby encouraging earlier retirement. This is
arguably the main (first order) effect since the benefit curve b(R) is unchanged (it is not
a function of health) and the remaining benefits of retirement (second, third and fourth
terms on the RHS of 18) constitute only about 28 percent of the total marginal benefits of
retirement (or of the total marginal benefits of work, since these are equal at the optimum)
for a healthy individual. In other words, the change in the marginal benefits of work due
to a (relatively large) health shock is likely to be substantially larger than the change in
the marginal benefits of retirement since the component of the marginal benefits of work
that are amenable to change (100 percent) is larger than the component of the marginal
benefits of retirement that are amenable to change (28 percent).11 Thus, ceteris paribus,
8Net pension replacement rates for OECD countries are on average 72 percent and range between 41
percent (Japan) and 112 percent (Iceland) for the median male earner (OECD, 2011).
9A natural and frequently made assumption is that wealth A(t) increases remaining lifetime utility
(from t onwards), but at a diminishing rate ∂qA(t)/∂A(t) = (∂
2/∂A(t)2)
∫ T∗
t
U(∗)e−βsds < 0, where T ∗
denotes optimal length of life and U(∗) denotes the maximized utility function (i.e., along the optimal
paths for the controls, state functions, and for the optimal length of life).
10There is also a longevity effect of wealth: wealthy individuals live longer (Galama 2015). This effect
is arguably smaller since the analysis considers two individuals of identical health status at the age of
retirement (and health status is arguably more important to longevity than is wealth) and because the
longevity effect is an indirect effect, operating through the effect that wealth has on longevity and longevity
in turn has on retirement (by contrast the wealth effect is a direct effect of wealth).
11It is true that the additional marginal benefits of retirement (second, third and fourth terms on the
RHS of 18) may be reduced as a result of poor health, resulting in a smaller “Rest” term for an unhealthy
versus a healthy individual (for simplicity these are shown in Figure 6 as being identical in size) and
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Rest,	Healthy,	
Wealthy	
R 
Y[HH (R)] 	
Y[H®]	
R 
b(R)	
RW* R* 
Figure 5: Stylized representation of the optimality condition for retirement (18) for a wealthy
(dashed lines) and poor (dotted lines) individual, conditional on health status HH(R) for a healthy
individual.
less healthy individuals retire earlier: ill health has a positive effect on the retirement
probability.
Financial Incentives Figure 7 provides a stylized representation of the effect of
financial incentives on the optimal age of retirement (18), conditional on wealth qA(R) for a
healthy individual. The comparison here is between two identical individuals (importantly,
with identical wealth [permanent income] qA(R)) who differ in the financial incentives they
face (the level and shape of the benefit function b(R)). Conditional on wealth the only
change in the marginal benefit of retirement occurs in the first and second term on the
RHS of equation (18). Both effects are captured in the shifted benefits curve (red dashed
line). Also the marginal benefit of work is unchanged. As the Figure shows, more generous
benefits lead to earlier retirement.
Affordability proposition The affordability proposition is the prediction that, all else
held equal, the increase in the likelihood of retirement following a sudden health event
is greater among those individuals with higher pension wealth, if the pension benefit is
concave with age. The affordability proposition is in regard to the difference in response to
a health shock. Figure 8 adds to Figure 5 a stylized representation of the same comparison
between a wealthy and a poorer individual but now for a wealthy and a poor individual
therefore the effect of these terms may be to increase the optimal age of retirement somewhat. Still, since
these terms constitute 28 percent of the total marginal benefit of retirement (or equivalently of the total
marginal benefit of work), the effect is not likely to be dominant.
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 Y[HU (R)]	
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RU* R* 
Figure 6: Stylized representation of the optimality condition for retirement (18) for a healthy
(dotted lines) and unhealthy (dashed lines) individual, conditional on wealth status qA(R).
	
RH* 
R 
Rest,	Healthy	
Y[H®]	
 Y[HH (R)] 	
b(R)	
R* 
b(R)	
Figure 7: Stylized representation of the optimality condition for retirement (18) for an individual
facing low (dotted line) and high (dashed line) financial incentives to retire, conditional on wealth
(permanent income) qA(R), for a healthy individual.
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who are both unhealthy HU (R).
As Figure 8 illustrates, wealthy and poor individuals retire earlier after a health shock.
Further, the size of the reduction in the optimal age of retirement is smaller for the poor
∆RP than for the wealthy ∆RW , if the functional form of the pension benefit b(R) is
convex with the age of retirement R, as is shown. The opposite is true if the functional
form of the pension benefit b(R) is concave. Thus for the affordability proposition to hold,
the functional dependence has to be convex. As Figures 1 and 2 show this is true for the
early retirement scheme, except for a bump at age 60, in the setting under consideration.
	
Rest,	Healthy,	
Poor	
Rest,	Healthy	
Wealthy	
Rest,	
Unhealthy,	
Poor	
Rest,	
Unhealthy,	
Wealthy	
 Y[HU (R)]	
Y[HH (R)] 	
R 
Y[H®]	
PRΔ 	
WRΔ 	
R 
b(R)	
Figure 8: Figure adds to Figure 5 a stylized representation of the same graph for an unhealthy
HU (R) individual.
Reinforcement proposition The reinforcement proposition is the prediction that, all
else held equal, the effect of financial incentives on retirement decisions of healthy workers
is reinforced when a health shock occurs if the pension benefit is concave with age.
The reinforcement proposition is also in regard to the difference in response to financial
incentives after a health shock. Figure 9 adds to Figure 7 a stylized representation of
the same comparison but for an unhealthy individual HU (R). Reduced health HU (R)
reduces earnings Y [HU (R−)] thereby encouraging earlier retirement. This is arguably the
main (first order) effect, following identical reasoning as was presented in the preceding
discussion of affordability. As Figure 9 also illustrates, unhealthy individuals are modestly
more responsive to financial incentives (compare ∆RU with ∆RH). Since other factors
(the “Rest” term) may also change we do not expect to find strong effects.
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Figure 9: Figure adds to the Figure 7 a stylized representation of the same graph for an unhealthy
HU (R) individual.
4 Empirical strategy
In the next sections we derive an empirically testable relation from the theory (section 4),
contrast the theory with the canonical framework for retirement (Stock and Wise, 1990,
section 4.1), and describe how we estimate the models (section 4.2).
The optimality condition (18) suggests the following empirical specification. First,
retirement is determined by the difference between earnings from labour and the pension
benefit (or replacement income). Individuals retire when benefits can be claimed and at
the time when claiming is optimal. Second, retirement is influenced by the rate of change
in benefits ∂b(R)/∂R, since postponing retirement may be attractive when it results in
higher benefits, and by expected longevity T . Third, besides these financial incentives,
there are two more terms (the third and fourth on the RHS). Both of these are a function
of wealth / permanent income. The appropriate measure of wealth would be the sum of
private A(t) and pension wealth b(R)
∫ T
t e
−δtdt. In our data we only have information on
pension wealth, which is by far the most important component (more than 60%) of total
household wealth for the 65-70 age group (van Ooijen et al. 2015). Since high pension
wealth is generally positively correlated with private wealth, we use pension wealth as a
proxy for full wealth (or permanent income qA(R)). Our specification then becomes
p(R) = α0 + α1{Y [H(R)]− b(R)]}+ α2[b(R+ 1)− b(R)] + α3WR + α4T (19)
where p(R) is the probability of retirement at age R, WR is pension wealth, T is expected
longevity, and α0, α1, α2, α3, and α4 are constants.
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4.1 Comparison with Stock and Wise
For comparison, in modeling retirement, we also follow the option value retirement model
of Stock and Wise (1990), which assumes that individuals compare the expected present
value of retiring immediately (in utility terms) to the expected present value of continuing
to work and retiring at the optimal age in the future:
OVa = max(Vj − Va), j = a+ 1, . . . , R (20)
where V is the value function at age a of retiring at future age j. This value function is
computed as:
Vj =
j∑
s=a
ρsY
γ
s +
S∑
s=j+1
ρs [kBs(j)]
γ , (21)
and ρs are the survival probabilities, S is age of (certain) death, Ys stands for earnings,
Bs(j) for the pension benefit when retiring at age j. We impose β = .97, γ = 0.75 and
k = 1.5, following previous studies (Stock and Wise, 1990; Coile and Gruber, 2007; and
Wise, 2016).
The OV takes into account that individuals in their retirement decisions weigh the
additional utility from an increase in total labour earnings with the reduced utility from
receiving benefits over a lower number of years and the disutility of labour. Depending on
the shape of the benefit function, benefits may increase if the individual retires later, and
thus utility.
In addition, we consider the peak value model, one of the versions of the option value
model, in which individuals compare the total discounted income from (early-)retirement
benefits that they receive if they would retire today at age a, to the total discounted
income from (early-)retirement benefits that they would receive if they would retire in the
year j in which they would receive the highest discounted benefits, as follows:
PVa = max(PWh − PWa), h = a+ 1, . . . , R (22)
where PWa is the pension Wealth (PW) calculated as the net present value of the pension
benefits that an individual retiring at age a would receive:
PWa(R) =
64∑
s=R
γt β
s−aBERt (R) +
T∑
s=65
γt β
s−aBPt (R), (23)
where s is the current age, R is the retirement age, β is the discount factor,12 γt is the
survival probability,13 BERt are the early retirement benefits, and B
P
t are old-age pension
benefits.
12The discount factor is 3% for all individuals (hence the discount rate is 0.9708).
13Survival probability tables were provided by PFZW.
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4.2 Model estimation
We estimate the effect of health, and of the different financial measures explained above,
on the probability of being retired in year t + 1 conditional on working in year t using
regression equations of the form:
P (Rit = 1) = F (β
′Xi,t + α′Si,t−1 + γ′,Wi,t) (24)
where Si,t−1 are health shocks between t − 2 and t − 1,14 Wi,t is the vector of financial
incentives of individual i at t and Xi,t is the vector of predictors, which include
socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. We estimate the model as a
logit.15 We cluster standard errors at the individual level to allow for within individual
autocorrelation in the error term.
Three sources of variation help us to identify the effect of financial incentives on early
retirement behaviour. First, the replacement rate of the OBU scheme varies by year of
birth; it decreases by one percentage point per year of birth. Second, the length and size
of contributions to the scheme varies between individuals. Third, individuals born after
1948 (regardless of their work history in the sector) are not eligible for OBU.
5 Data
Our main data source is the administrative register of the second largest pension fund
in the Netherlands, the health care sector pension fund (Pensioenfonds Zorg en Welzijn,
PFZW). PFZW provides pension arrangements to more than 2 million employees in the
health and social-work sector. Occupations participating in the PFZW range from nurses
to medical doctors, and include various supporting jobs, such as, e.g., in administration.
We have access to individual employee information on gender, date of birth, working hours,
wages, tenure, and pension and early-retirement entitlements for the period 1999-2003. We
also use survival probability tables provided by PFZW, needed to compute pension wealth
and option values.
Importantly and uniquely, we observe in the PFZW register the same personalized
information that all PFZW insurees receive annually on the (early-) retirement benefits
they would receive at all future possible ages if they were to retire at that age through either
FLEX or OBU schemes. Thus, individuals in our sample are informed about the benefits
of retiring today versus some date in the future. In computing the financial incentives, we
assume that individuals choose the option that gives them the highest benefits payout at
each age. As we can observe their actual (not self-reported) pension rights, based on their
14Labour-market status in our data set is the status on January 1st of each wave. Thus, we condition
on health shocks that occurred sometime during the previous year to avoid reverse causality.
15We also estimated these models using a complementary log-log function and the results were very
similar. Results are available upon request.
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actual salary and seniority in the pension fund used to compute pension benefits,16 most
of the measurement error typically encountered in surveys is removed. In doing so, we
avoid downward bias in estimates for the effect of pension incentives, as shown by Belloni
and Alessi (2009).
Individual PFZW pension data for 1999-2003 were linked to three other administrative
data sources by Statistics Netherlands: (1) the municipality register ((Gemeentelijke Basis
Administratie persoonsgegevens, GBA) which provides demographic information on birth
date, marital status, household size, local migration and mortality; (2) the administrative
employment register (Stelsel van Sociaal-Statistische Bestanden, SSB) with individual
information on all employees in the Netherlands, including working hours, income from
labour, and employer information; and (3) the hospital discharge register (Landelijke
Medische Registratie, LMR) which includes information on diagnosis, type of admission
(scheduled or emergency) and length of stay of all hospital admissions.
Labour-market status is missing in the PFZW data for some individuals in some
periods. Attrition occurs: (i) when a participant has submitted an application for
retirement; (ii) if the address is unknown; (iii) when the insuree becomes a so-called
“sleeper”(i.e. is no longer employed in the health-care sector); or (iv) if the authority,
which administers their pension entitlements at PFZW, has arrears of payment.17
Attrition is problematic as individuals may still be employed, or may be retired.
Fortunately, from the SSB we can recover whether the individual is employed or not
and use this information to reduce the number of missing observations.
We select individuals who are in employment and aged 55-63. Table 1 shows the median
values, by age group, of the various measures of financial incentives used in the retirement
models. The first column shows that the difference between earnings and pension benefits
Y (a) − b(a) decreases with age a. Most of this decrease is due to increasing pension
benefits, since median wages do not decline markedly with age (column 6, Y (a)). The
second column shows the change in pension benefits associated with retiring next year
versus retiring this year. Consistent with figures 1 and 2, we observe the highest median
value for this measure for individuals aged 58. Columns 3 shows that pension wealth
W increases up to age 59, with a marked decrease thereafter (note these numbers are
logged). Columns 4 and 5 show median values for the Option Value and Peak Value
measures, used in the Stock and Wise model specifications (equations 20 and 22). While
the median OV of remaining at work is positive for all age groups, it quickly approaches
zero as age approaches the statutory retirement age. A negative PV can be interpreted as
a tax on further labour-force participation. The median PV turns negative at age 57, stays
negative at age 58 and 59 as the scheme offers the opportunity of part-time retirement at
these ages, and turns positive thereafter.18
16See Euwals et al. (2010a) for further details on calculation of the NPV. Computations of pension
wealth and marginal incentives are based on Trevisan and Euwals (2011).
17Euwals et al. (2010a) provide a detailed description of attrition in the PFZW dataset. We follow them
to reduce the number of missing observations.
18We observe a decrease in the PV before age 60 when some individuals can claim early-retirement
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Table 1: Median retirement incentives, by age.
Age (a) Y (a)− b(a) ∆b(a) ln(W ) OV PV Earnings Y (a)
55 2.141 0.052 11.014 94.908 1.942 2.538
56 2.085 0.132 11.022 77.669 1.966 2.537
57 2.011 0.089 11.360 61.790 -0.039 2.527
58 1.923 0.553 11.375 45.928 -0.014 2.530
59 1.445 0.000 11.358 34.364 -0.643 2.551
60 1.680 0.043 10.827 24.004 0.109 2.450
61 1.751 0.149 10.205 14.959 0.228 2.346
62 1.704 0.271 10.160 8.898 0.188 2.367
63 1.400 -0.527 10.255 4.517 0.092 2.359
Note: All measures, except ln(W ), are expressed in units of 10,000 (Euros, except for OV, which is
measured in utility units).
The hospital discharge register (LMR) provides information on both inpatient and
day-care patients of all hospitals in the Netherlands from 1998 to 2005. We observe (i)
whether an individual entered the hospital, (ii) whether the admission was not planned,
(iii) the admission and discharge date, and (iv) the primary diagnosis. We construct
measures of new health events (proxying health shocks) using the LMR data.
We obtain indicators of the occurrence of new health problems from diagnostic
information (ICD-9-CM codes). We select those codes that are likely to correspond to
a new and unexpected health problem if the individual did not go to the hospital in the
preceding year.19 This excludes diagnoses that can be first treated in outpatient care and
those related to chronic conditions. The procedure excludes, for example, all mental-health
problems and congenital diseases. Our health shock measure takes the value 1 if the
individual was admitted into hospital to be treated for any of these unexpected health
problems, and 0 otherwise. We use these hospital admissions deliberately to make it more
likely that the shocks are exogenous to labour outcomes.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics broken down by labour status in the next period.
benefits from OBU (see 2), since the maximum difference in pension wealth between today and the age at
which individuals obtain the largest benefits decreases
19We identified with the help of a medical expert all diagnoses that could indicate new and unexpected
health events in the following groups: i) infectious and parasitic diseases (some codes within 001-139); ii)
neoplasms (some codes within 140-239); iii) endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases and immunity
disorders (some codes within 204-279); iv) diseases of the nervous system and sense organs (some codes
within 320-389); v) diseases of the circulatory system (some codes within 390-459); vi) diseases of the
respiratory system (some codes within 460-519); vii) diseases of the digestive system (some codes within
520-579); viii) diseases of the genitourinary system (some codes within 580-629); ix) diseases of the skin and
subcutaneous tissue (some codes within 680-709); x) diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective
tissue (some codes within 710-739); xi) injury and poisoning (some codes within 800-999). The exact codes
are available upon request.
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As expected, we see that the difference between earnings and benefits Y (a) − b(a), the
change in benefits ∆b(a), the option value (OV) and the peak value (PV) are lower among
the group of individuals that is retired in the next period, compared to the group that
stays employed. Further, the incidence of any new health event in the previous wave is
2.9% for the group of individuals that is retired in the next period, and 2.3% for the group
that stays employed.
Many individuals are working part-time: the average number of hours worked is around
24. Tenure in the sector is on average 14.5 years for those that are retired and 11.5 years
for the group that stays employed. The gross yearly wage ranges between 29 thousand
Euros for those that remain employed and 31 thousand Euros for those that retire. Other
socio-demographic covariates used in the analysis include: age dummies, marital status
(married, single, widowed and divorced), household size, and Dutch nationality.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics by labour-market status in the next wave.
Retired Employed
[Y (a)− b(a)]/10,000 1.556 2.300
∆b(a)/10,000 0.205 0.219
ln(W ) 11.534 10.991
OV /10,000 42.848 81.673
PV /10,000 -0.553 1.531
Y (a)/10,000 3.123 2.948
Health Shock 0.029 0.023
Age 56 0.002 0.253
Age 57 0.070 0.196
Age 58 0.097 0.165
Age 59 0.618 0.044
Age 60 0.169 0.019
Age 61 0.024 0.012
Age 62 0.016 0.007
Age 63 0.004 0.002
Single 0.033 0.033
Widow 0.018 0.019
Divorced 0.059 0.077
Dutch 0.890 0.891
N household members 2.273 2.427
Tenure 14.529 11.515
Hours worked 24.603 23.666
N 8,214 126,312
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6 Results
6.1 Effects of financial incentives and new health events
We consider three sets of measures of financial incentives, each corresponding to one of
the three alternative empirical specifications we consider. The first specification, model 1,
follows equation (19), which we derived from our theory (see section 4). Consequently, in
model 1, the probability p(R) of early retirement is influenced by the difference between
current earnings Y (R) and the expected benefits b(R) of early retirement if retiring at that
age R, the accrual rate of benefits in the next period b(R+1)−b(R) and the change in those
benefits when reaching the statutory retirement age of 65.20 We compare the estimates for
model 1 with those for a specification based on the option value model (model 2; equation
20) and those for a specification based on the peak value model (model 3; equation 22),
which, respectively, include OV and PV as measures of financial incentives. All models
control for the onset of any new and unexpected health event (as explained earlier) as
a measure of a health shock.21 We exclude the log of pension wealth ln(W ) from the
peak-value model (model 3) because the PV is constructed using measures of pension
wealth W . Likewise, we exclude earnings from models 1 and 2 because it is correlated
with the empirical measures of financial incentives that these models do include.
We first separately examine the effects of financial incentives and the effects of health
shocks on retirement decisions, and compare the results of model 1 with the option-value
model’s OV (model 2) and PV (model 3) specifications (Stock and Wise 1990; Coile and
Gruber 2007). We then investigate the interaction of financial incentives with health
shocks. Table 3 presents the marginal effect estimates of the variables of interest, while
the coefficients are shown in Table 8 in the Appendix.
In our preferred specification (model 1), derived from the theoretical model presented in
section 3, we find a strong and significant negative effect for the difference between labour
earnings and pension benefits Y (R) − b(R): every 10,000 Euros of excess earnings over
pension benefits reduces the probability of transition into ER by 1.3 percentage points. By
contrast, no significant effects are found for year-to-year changes in benefits, be these either
early-retirement benefits received at age a (∆b(a)/10,000)or retirement benefits at age 65
(∆b(a = 65)/10,000). This may reflect the fact that this term captures a second-order
effect (changes in benefits), which tends to be smaller than first-order effects (the level
of benefits). Further, we may not have sufficient variation to identify the effect of both
age dummies and changes in benefits, especially when the largest change in benefits for
most of our sample (see 2) occurs at age 60 and OBU benefits remain flat afterwards (i.e.,
∆b does not vary). There is some evidence in favour of this possibility. Re-estimating
20We add the change in the difference in benefits received at age 65 if retiring at R + 1 compared to
R to the empirical specification because, in our setting, individuals receive early-retirement benefits until
age 64, and retirement benefits from age 65. These two benefits are not necessarily the same.
21We test the robustness of results using an indicator of whether the individual had an unplanned
hospitalization in urgent need of treatment (an admission to the emergency department) as an alternative
measure. The results are qualitatively similar and are available upon request.
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Table 3: Marginal effects on the probability of retirement.
model 1 model 2 model 3
(eq. 19) (OV, eq. 20) (PV, eq. 22)
[Y (a)− b(a)]/10,000 -0.0131***
(0.0009)
∆b(a)/10,000 0.0002
(0.0029)
OV /10,000 -0.0006***
(<0.0001)
PV /10,000 -0.0085***
(0.0007)
Y (a)/10,000 -0.0025***
(0.0005)
ln(W ) 0.0267*** 0.0323***
(0.0015) (0.0020)
∆b(a = 65)/10,000 0.0035
(0.0035)
Health Shock 0.0073** 0.0069** 0.0061*
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
N 134,526 134,526 134,522
AIC 31,149.53 31,241.24 31,742.69
BIC 31,375.14 31,447.24 31,948.69
Log-likelihood -15,551.76 -15,599.62 -15,850.35
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
model 1 (see Table 9) including age linearly (rather than using age dummies) we find that
an increase in ∆b(a)/10,000 significantly reduces ER by the same order of magnitude as
Y (R) − b(R) (but ∆b(a = 65)/10,000) remains statistically insignificant). This suggests
that perhaps age dummies take out too much of the variation in the change in benefits,
resulting in the term’s statistical insignificance. An alternative explanation for this result
is that the consequences for retirement benefits of postponing retirement by a year are not
sufficiently well understood by the individual. However, this is unlikely given that PFZW
insured individuals received individualized detailed information on the amount of (early-)
retirement benefits they would receive at all future ages under both schemes.
We also find that pension wealth matters, as predicted by the theory. The probability
of ER is significantly and positively affected by pension wealth (as measured by ln(W )):
a 1% rise in pension wealth W leads to a 0.027 percentage points increase in the odds of
ER, reflecting an income effect if leisure is a normal good.
For comparison, with the specifications based on Stock and Wise (1990), we find
evidence that both the option value and the peak value have a significant negative effect
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on the probability of ER. Higher values of either act as a deterrent to ER. An increase
of 10,000 Euros in the PV (OV) is estimated to reduce the probability of ER by 0.85
(0.06) percentage points. Likewise, pension wealth (in the OV model) shows a significant
positive income effect, while earnings were found to reduce the likelihood of retirement:
an increase of 10,000 Euros is associated with a quarter of a percentage point increase in
the likelihood of retirement. The goodness of fit measures (AIC, BIC, -LL) suggest that
our theoretical model best fits the data.
In all three models, our health shock measure is associated with a small, ranging from
0.61 to 0.73 percentage points, but significant increase in the probability of ER. This
confirms that health events do play a role in ER decisions when financial conditions are
controlled for.
To check the robustness of these estimates, we have estimated all three models using
an alternative definition of retirement, which includes all exits from employment, i.e., the
dependent variable takes the value one if the individual is not working in the next period
(see Table 10 in the Appendix). With this alternative definition, we find that the effects
of the financial variables do not differ substantially from the corresponding estimates for
the ER model, but, not surprisingly, the effects of a health shock on the probability of this
extended definition of retirement are generally 7-8 times higher than in the models for ER.
We attribute this to the possibility that those who had a health shock that hindered them
from working left the labour market (mostly) through other routes (either stopped working
or went into disability) and therefore were excluded from our previous analysis. We believe
this is not an undue limitation of our approach, for the evaluation of (early-) retirement
policies should focus on providing evidence on how different individuals react to financial
incentives conditional on them being able to work. In addition, while (early-) retirement is
often not well defined in surveys, the use of administrative data guarantees that we identify
as early-retired those individuals that are receiving early-retirement benefits. Last, the
analysis of the effects of financial incentives on other exits from the labour market would
require the use of estimated measures and therefore be prone to downward bias (Belloni
and Alessi, 2009)
Job characteristics and socio-demographic variables also play an important role in
explaining transitions into retirement (see Table 8 in the Appendix). The larger the
number of hours worked, the lower the probability that individuals retire, capturing
an apparent lower labour-market attachment among individuals that work fewer hours.
Tenure in the sector does not significantly influence the retirement probability. Men are
less likely to retire. The probability of early retirement is lower for single, divorced and
widowed as compared to married individuals. Similarly, household size decreases the
probability of early retirement.
6.2 Heterogeneity in the effects of health shocks by socioeconomic status
In this subsection we examine whether the effect of a health shock differs between high-
and low-wealth individuals (affordability proposition). For this purpose, we define high
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wealth as above the median of the distribution of pension wealth. Table 4 compares the
estimated marginal effect of the probability of retiring after a health shock for high- and
low-wealth individuals thus defined. We use the same specification as in model 1 and add
an interaction term between our measure of a new and unexpected health shock and a
binary indicator for high wealth.
Table 4: Average marginal effect of health shock by wealth.
Retirement
Below-median W 0.0001 (0.0049)
Above-median W 0.0119** (0.0041)
Notes: The difference in these two marginal effects is significant at the 10% level (p-value=0.07)
As Table 4 shows, we find a significant difference in the likelihood of retirement
between poorer and richer individuals following a health shock, with a health shock
having a substantially larger impact on the likelihood of retirement for richer individuals.
Moreover, a health shock does not significantly increase the probability of retiring for
poorer individuals. The difference of 1.18 percentage points is large relative to the effect
of a health shock found earlier (0.73 percentage points; see model 1, Table 3), suggesting
the presence of an important degree of heterogeneity in responses to health shocks by
wealth.
In order to test whether this result is driven by unobserved differences in skill levels,
we estimate the corresponding average marginal effects for individuals above and below
median earnings (see Table 5) and find that for the high earners the effect is positive and
significant while for low earners it is not. The difference between average marginal effects
is, however, not statistically significant, suggesting that differences in the effect of health
shocks by wealth W are not driven by differences in skill levels.
Table 5: Average marginal effect of health shock by earnings.
Retirement
Below-median earnings 0.0093 (0.0071)
Above-median earnings 0.0071** (0.0036)
Notes: The difference in these marginal effects is not significant at the 10% level.
As a further robustness check, we use disposable household income from tax records
(Regionaal Inkomens Onderzoek, RIO) available for about one third of our respondents.22
Using this alternative definition, we also find that a health shock has a significantly larger
impact on the likelihood of retirement for richer individuals (p− value = 0.046).
22RIO is a longitudinal administrative register that covers one third of the Dutch population and contains
information on personal and household disposable income that is computed as gross income from wages,
profits and wealth, earnings plus transfers less taxes and premiums.
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Finally, as a check on whether these differences across socioeconomic status are driven
by differences in the types of health shock, Table 6 shows the proportion of individuals
affected by the different medical conditions that in aggregate constitute the health shock
measure. Note that there are no remarkable differences in these proportions between high-
and low-wealth individuals under the three alternative definitions. The one exception is
for respiratory diseases, which are six times more likely to occur for low pension wealth W
individuals. However, we see no such differences for the household income and earnings
measures.
Table 6: Proportion of individuals with different types of health shocks, by income.
W < W > HHincome < HHincome > Earnings < Earnings >
median median median median median median
Infectious 0.004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004
Cancer 0.0070 0.0063 0.0052 0.0064 0.0066 0.0067
Endocrine 0.0000 <0.0001 0.0000 <0.0001 0.0000 <0.0001
Nervous 0.0029 0.0028 0.0024 0.0028 0.0027 0.0029
Circulatory 0.0027 0.0045 0.0033 0.0034 0.0032 0.0037
Stroke 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0013 0.001
Respiratory 0.0050 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006
Digestive 0.0012 0.0014 0.0014 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013
Genitourinary 0.0026 0.0015 0.0027 0.0021 0.0025 0.0019
Skin 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002
Musculoskeletal 0.0016 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0015 0.0012
Injury 0.0038 0.0037 0.0037 0.0036 0.0040 0.0037
6.3 Heterogeneity in the effect of financial variables by the presence of
health shocks
Next we focus on whether the effects of financial incentives change in the presence of
a health shock. In order to test for a reinforcement effect, we use specifications where
both the difference between earnings and benefits Y (R) − b(R) and the annual increase
in benefits ∆b(R) are interacted with the health shock indicator. The estimates in Table
7 show the difference between the marginal effect of financial incentives for an individual
with a health shock and the marginal effect of financial incentives for an individual without
a health shock.
We find a significant heterogeneous effect for the difference between earnings and
benefits Y (R) − b(R). The sign of the estimate suggests that an increase in this gap
reduces the likelihood of retirement to a greater extent for individuals who had a health
shock: for every increase of 10,000 Euro in the difference between earnings and benefits
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Table 7: Difference in the average marginal effect of financial incentives by health
Retirement
Earnings-Benefits -0.0093** (0.0047)
Change in benefits 0.0095 (0.0074)
the likelihood of retirement is reduced by 0.93 percentage points more for an individual
with a health shock (compared to an - otherwise identical individual who did not have a
health shock). This is a relatively large difference if we consider that the corresponding
effect in the model without interactions is a reduction by 0.73 percentage points for every
10,000 Euro (see model 1, Table 3). Note that the difference of the marginal effect of the
change in benefits is of the same magnitude as the difference in the marginal effect of the
gap between earnings and benefits. It is, however, statistically insignificant due to a larger
standard error.
Figure 10 provides further detail on the effect of the financial incentive measure that is
the difference between earnings and benefits for individuals who did and who did not have
a new and unexpected health shock: it shows the marginal effect computed at different
points of the Y (R)−b(R) distribution for the two groups (with and without a health shock).
First, note that for high values of this measure, that is, for individuals who would incur
a large income loss upon retiring early, the effect is close to zero both for those with and
without a health shock. In other words, a change of 10,000 Euros in the difference between
earnings and benefits does not have a significant effect on the retirement probability for
these individuals, because the drop in income Y (R)− b(R) resulting from ER is too large.
Second, the effect becomes larger in magnitude, and more so for those with a health
shock, for negative values of this financial measure, that is, for individuals whose pension
benefit exceeds their earnings. For example, the marginal effect of Y (R)− b(R) when the
difference equals zero is twice as large for the unhealthy (about -0.04) compared to the
healthy (-0.02). This confirms the prediction from the theoretical model that ill health
reinforces the effect of financial incentives, given the convex shape of the benefit function
in our institutional setting.
7 Conclusion and discussion
It is well known that both adverse health events and financial incentives affect the decision
to retire (early) from the labour force. What is less well known is how these effects can
be understood theoretically and how they interact in retirement decisions. This paper
aims to fill these gaps. It contributes theoretically by proposing an extended model of
health capital that explicitly models the effect of financial incentives, health, wealth,
longevity and the optimal age of retirement. The model generates new testable predictions
about the interaction between financial incentives and health in retirement, which we then
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Figure 10: Distribution of the average marginal effect of the gap between earnings and benefits
on early-retirement as a function of the gap, by health status. Authors’ calculations based on the
estimated model 1.
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empirically examine using a rich source of data on the retirement behaviour of Dutch
workers.
Our theoretical findings are as follows. First, our model predicts that, ceteris paribus,
wealthier individuals will retire earlier: they value leisure relatively more and can afford
to retire. Secondly, because a health shock reduces the marginal benefits of work versus
retirement, the theory predicts that, all else equal, individuals with reduced health will
retire earlier. Third, more generous retirement benefits will, ceteris paribus, lead to earlier
retirement. None of these predictions are very surprising. The usefulness of the theoretical
model becomes rather more apparent when considering the interactions between health,
wealth and financial incentives. From the theory we derive two novel propositions: (i)
that wealthier individuals (compared to poorer individuals) are more likely to retire for
health reasons (affordability proposition), and (ii) that health problems make older workers
more responsive to financial incentives encouraging retirement (reinforcement proposition).
These predictions are valid if the benefits function is convex with age, as in our data.
Each of these theoretical predictions we subject to empirical testing with data on the
retirement patterns of Dutch health-care workers. Exploiting quasi-exogenous variation
in health as measured by unexpected hospital admissions, and exogenous variation in
financial incentives for retirement over the period 1999-2003, we estimate the marginal
effects of financial incentives and of health shocks separately, as well as their interaction,
on the probability of early retirement. Our empirical findings are as follows. First,
the difference between earnings and benefits reduces the probability of early retirement
substantially. Second, we establish the expected positive effect of pension wealth on earlier
retirement: a 1 percent rise in pension wealth increases the probability of early retirement
by 0.027 percentage points, reflecting an income effect if leisure is a normal good. Third, a
health shock raises the retirement probability: the increase is significant but small (0.007
percentage points).
We also find support for our affordability proposition: the effect of a health shock
is significant for above median pension wealth individuals, but not for those with below
median pension wealth. Further, we find that the effect of a health shock on retirement is
significantly larger for individuals living in a high-income household. We also find empirical
support for our reinforcement proposition whereby the effect of financial incentives
encouraging retirement, in this case a smaller gap between earnings and pension benefits,
is larger for individuals who recently suffered from a health shock.
The limitations of our analysis are mainly related to the focus on ER and the
abstraction from alternative exit routes from the labour market. As we have argued,
this focus is justified to provide evidence on how individuals react to financial incentives,
conditional on them being able to work. However, to the extent that the set of rules
governing DI exits do not discriminate perfectly between those who are able and unable
to work (allowing some workers to take the DI route after a health shock who would still
be able to work in some capacity), our estimates for the effects of a health shock on ER
may be considered a lower bound.
This suggests important avenues for further research. Contingent on the availability
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of data of similar quality, our theoretical model and empirical specifications could be
extended to accommodate competing exits from the labour force. Another avenue
would be to test whether the empirical results we have documented are valid in other
contexts/countries and whether such replication (or lack thereof) is related to the shape
of the benefits function in a way that is consistent with the theory. The theoretical
predictions of affordability and reinforcement rely on the convexity of the benefit function
with age. If the function were concave, one would expect to observe the opposite patterns.
Thus, (i) poorer individuals would be more likely to retire for health reasons, and (ii) health
problems would make older workers less responsive to financial incentives for retirement.
This points to the possibility that differences in responses to financial incentives and
health shocks across countries might not only be explained by difference in the generosity
of retirement benefits, but also by whether the benefit function is concave or convex.
As for the policy implications, our theoretical and empirical findings point to the
importance of assessing financial incentives for their potential reinforcement of health
shocks. Our results confirm the potential of reforms reducing exits by tweaking the
financial incentives of retirement systems. Of further added value in this context is
evidence that the effect of financial incentives persist even for people who had a health
shock. In fact, the effects of financial incentives are greater for those that suffered a health
shock. Notwithstanding the caveats discussed above, and subject to additional evidence
from other contexts, we believe that this is a result of relevance for retirement policies.
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Table 8: Coefficients and (SE) of all the variables included in the models.
M1 M2 M3
[Y (a)− b(a)]/10,000 -0.0131***
(0.0009)
∆b(a)/10,000 0.0002
(0.0029)
∆b(a = 65)/10,000 0.0035
(0.0035)
OV /10,000 -0.0006***
(<0.0001)
PV /10,000 -0.0085***
(0.0007)
Y (a)/10,000 -0.0025***
(0.0005)
ln(W ) 0.0267*** 0.0323***
(0.0015) (0.0020)
Health Shock 0.0073** 0.0069** 0.0061*
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Age 57 0.0201*** 0.0192*** 0.0183***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Age 58 0.0329*** 0.0228*** 0.0294***
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Age 59 0.3941*** 0.3219*** 0.3774***
(0.0066) (0.0108) (0.0090)
Age 60 0.3676*** 0.2562*** 0.3414***
(0.0084) (0.0117) (0.0086)
Age 61 0.1454*** 0.0820*** 0.1338***
(0.0102) (0.0074) (0.0088)
Age 62 0.1508*** 0.0796*** 0.1419***
(0.0137) (0.0095) (0.0114)
Age 63 0.1556*** 0.0770*** 0.1318***
(0.0410) (0.0160) (0.0206)
Male -0.0144*** -0.0142*** -0.0184***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015)
Year 2000 0.0118*** 0.0120*** 0.0151***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Year 2001 -0.0047*** -0.0044*** -0.0004
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Year 2002 0.0118*** 0.0122*** 0.0171***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Widow -0.0127*** -0.0128*** -0.0134***
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031)
Divorced -0.0067*** -0.0067*** -0.0087***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Single -0.0051* -0.0073** -0.011***
(0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0027)
Dutch 0.0057*** 0.0054*** 0.0063***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
N household members -0.0035*** -0.0035*** -0.0036***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Tenure 0.0001 0.0002 0.0033***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Hours -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0008***
(0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0001)
N 134,526 134,526 134,522
AIC 31,149.53 31,241.24 31,742.69
BIC 31,375.14 31,447.24 31,948.69
Log-likelihood -15,551.76 -15,599.62 -15,850.35
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
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Table 9: Marginal effects on the probability of retirement using linear age trend.
model 1 model 2 model 3
(eq. 19) (OV, eq. 20) (PV, eq. 22)
[Y (a)− b(a)]/10,000 -0.0149***
(0.0010)
∆b(a)/10,000 -0.0149***
(0.0010)
OV /10,000 -0.0008***
(<0.0001)
PV /10,000 -0.0136***
(0.0008)
Y (a)/10,000 -0.0064***
(0.0006)
ln(W ) 0.0320*** 0.0399***
(0.0014) (0.0021)
∆b(a = 65)/10,000 0.0024
(0.0027)
Health Shock 0.0086*** 0.0091*** 0.0077**
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033)
N 134,526 134,526 134,522
AIC 32,525.56 34,055.29 34,083.56
BIC 32,692.33 34,202.43 34,230.70
Log-likelihood -16,245.78 -17,012.60 -17,026.80
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
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Table 10: Marginal effects on the probability of extended retirement.
model 1 model 2 model 3
(eq. 19) (OV, eq. 20) (PV, eq. 22)
[Y (a)− b(a)]/10,000 -0.0146***
(0.0011)
∆b(a)/10,000 0.0012
(0.0038)
OV /10,000 -0.0005***
(<0.0001)
PV /10,000 -0.0090***
(0.0008)
Y (a)/10,000 -0.0024***
(0.0005)
ln(W ) 0.0208*** 0.0235***
(0.0022) (0.0026)
∆b(a = 65)/10,000 0.0068
(0.0047)
Health Shock 0.0374*** 0.0369*** 0.0365***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046)
N 136,272 136,272 136,268
AIC 46,027.07 46,190.10 46,186.04
BIC 46,252.99 46,396.37 46,392.31
Log-likelihood -22,990.54 -23,074.10 -23,072.02
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
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